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MechanismIn this paper I discuss the way in which early sociology addressed the metabolic relationships between society
and nature. Father founders of social science such as Comte, Spencer, Marx, Schaeffle, Lilienfeld, Giddings,
Ward, Kidd, Geddes and some others shared a physiological vision of metabolism and all were concerned on
the problem of social regulation of metabolism. On closer examination, early social sciences had realized that
social and natural worlds are deeply interconnected even though they were trapped in the dilemma between
mechanism and finalism. A metabolic perspective allows us to understand where the organic interchange
between nature and society has problems endangering social reproduction. Yet, metabolism is not only a matter
of physical sciences but also of social ones for it is ruled and driven by social agents. Given the set of practices,
knowledge, and sociotechnical regimes that enable the metabolism, it is notable the almost entirely absence of
a sociology of metabolic exchanges, of the manner in which social systems (towns, firms, households) consume
“environment”, i.e. matter, energy, and bio-capacity. The paper suggests that social scientists should investigate
in the field of societal metabolic processes in an interdisciplinary perspective for exploring metabolic activators
such as organized labor, consumption, and practice regimes as was suggested by early sociologists.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Society draws matter, energy and services from nature for the pro-
duction of goods and services necessary to ensure the bio-psycho-
social continuity of itsmembers and of those infrastructures that contin-
ually recreate the possibility of its own existence. Problems posed by
environmental crises deeply affect the reproduction of global social sys-
tems and thus have become an object of social sciences research. How-
ever, contemporary sociology has rarely engagedwith the reproduction
processes that I call social metabolism.
In previous articles, I have dealt with analogies that sociologists of
the nineteenth and early twentieth century employed to explain the
links between society and nature (Padovan, 2008; 2003). In this paper,
I try to show that early sociology developedmaterial approaches that in-
corporated nature into foundational sociological models. Among early
sociologists, the suggestion of social metabolism was widely adopted.
It was used to describe mechanisms of action, reaction and adaptation
that occur in the context of relations of exchange and transformation
between society andnature. This vision could nowbe called coevolution.
However, it also had othermeanings. For some authors, coevolutionwas
amatter ofmorphology and analogy that paid attention to a society's in-
ternal organization and its embedding in natural evolution; for others, it39 0116702612.
lic exchanges and practices o
://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoinfwas amatter of physiology, a way of describing the functional exchange
of energy andmatter between society and the environment and how to
overcome the resistance of matter, thereby allowing social achieve-
ments; for still others, socialmetabolismwas a problem of the organiza-
tion, transformational activities, and technical regimes of both labor and
of a broader social regulation.
At that time, elements of an interestingmaterialist ontology emerged,
most likely derived from the influence of antimetaphysical positivism, as
in the case of Comte and Spencer or, among natural scientists,Moleschott
andHaeckel. In some sense, they indirectly denied the sociocentric deter-
minism, based on the Cartesian society/nature detachment, which char-
acterized the social sciences of the twentieth century. At that time, there
was not yet a functional distinction between the status of actor and
acted-upon and foot and footprint that was as clear as conventional
metaphors used today (Moore, 2011). As argued by Jason Moore
(2009), the social makes history, but not within biophysical relations
anddeterminations of its own choosing. Society is asmuch biophysically
constructed as nature is socially constituted, even as these constructions
and constitutions reveal distinctive modes of operation. In other words,
early sociology provides some insights into the reciprocity and circular-
ity of social and material changes, the role of living organisms and
“matter” in social sciences and the closing of the separation between
the cultural and the material (Reckwitz, 2002).
The prevailing early sociological models, with minor differences,
insisted on the metabolic coevolution of nature and society, relying
primarily on their formal and functional similarities. However, Comte,f regulation: The assemblage of environment and society in early social
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idea that society is an organism. They considered this similitude as proof
of the coevolution of society and nature. The constant exchange of anal-
ogies, metaphors, models and experimental data among disciplines
such as biology, astronomy, physics, economics, physiology, and sociol-
ogy provided an opportunity to investigate living and nonliving organ-
isms (from the smallest invertebrate to human societies) in terms of
metabolic systems that coevolve with their environment. Comte devel-
oped a societal embryology, Spencer an epigenetic social model, Haeck-
el a biogenetic fundamental law.
The metabolism approach provides an interesting reading of the
relations between exteriority and heterogeneity that stem from the
society/nature complex. In addition, this approach highlights the need
to think of society and nature as reciprocally embedded. Finally, it
seems possible to overcome the classical dualism between idealism
and materialism, culture and matter, and language and object, rein-
corporating the material (natural) into the social (cultural). In a few
words, metabolic approaches announce that the “material” coexists
and coevolves with the “cultural”. This means that, as suggested by
Bronislaw Szerszynski, the “metabolism of the human–technology
ensemble needs a biosemiotic analysis” simply because “each organism
inhabits its own semiotic environment, constituted by the ‘carriers of
significance’ to which its senses are attuned” (Szerszynski, 2010: 13).
A new metabolic perspective has been developed during the last
thirty years, primarily by the Harvard school of industrial metabo-
lism, the IFF Wien school of societal metabolism, and the Oregon
school of metabolic rift. These schools of thought encouraged different
disciplines—such as physics, ecology, biology, geography, economics,
sociology, anthropology, and organizational studies—to reciprocally col-
laborate. In the beginning, the metabolic perspective was used as a
paradigm to describe the exchange of matter between a city and its
environment (Wolman, 1965) or among industrial operations in a
manner that was analogous to the description of material and energy
balances in natural ecological systems. However, the current develop-
ment of some metabolic approaches is lacking in some aspects. For in-
stance, they are unable to establish a link to the actors responsible for
activating and changing metabolic processes, and therefore, it is not
clear which social actors should contribute to a strategy of balancing
metabolism. In this paper, I attempt to outline a sociological history of
metabolism that is a little bit different from that outlined by Fischer-
Kowalski (1998) and Fischer-Kowalski and Hüttler (1999) and that is
useful, I hope, for fostering ideas to open the chapter on societal metab-
olism ruling agents.
In the first section, I give a more accurate account of the metabolic
basis of early sociological thought, stressing agreements and contradic-
tions. In the second section, I give an account of ontological and episte-
mological problems connectedwith the physicism/vitalism and society/
nature dualisms, which still exist, albeit in different forms. In the third
section, I attempt to show that there already exists a sound basis for a
sociology with a strong foundation in society/nature metabolism. In
the fourth and fifth sections, I attempt to outline a connection between
social metabolism, labor and social practices. In the sixth section, I
engage with a critical analysis of the socioeconomic regulation of meta-
bolic mechanisms that transforms them into colonial or imperialistic
accumulative regimes.
2. The metabolic approach at the dawn of sociology
Nineteenth-century social scientists believed that society was not
only a sui generis entity but also a living organism that based its repro-
duction on matter and labor. Comte, Spencer, and Giddings were inter-
ested in the physiology and functions of organisms; for Novicow,
Lilienfeld, Espinas, and Kidd, the morphology of social and biological
organisms and their analogies were most important; Marx, Schaeffle
and Kropotkin focused on the societal organization of labor and
consumption as conditions of metabolism. The metabolic hypothesisPlease cite this article as: Padovan, D., Metabolic exchanges and practices o
sciences, Ecological Informatics (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoinfincreased the need to study peculiar phenomena of the nature/society
complex, such as consumption, circulation, exchange, processing, stor-
age, dissipation, growth, structuration, differentiation, evolution, coloni-
zation, and so on. The metabolic hypothesis also contains a mutualist
perspective because every living organism exchanges energy and
matter with its environment so that both can reproduce. Thus, it is
possible to call this metabolic approach social “physiology”, as sug-
gested by Kropotkin (Padovan, 1999).
To early sociologists, society appeared as a living body, the highest
manifestation of the process of organic evolution caused by an unceas-
ing relationship between the organism and its environment. Auguste
Comte believed that the study of man must necessarily pass through
the study of the external conditions in which he reproduces himself,
simultaneously as a biological species and as a society. Depending on
the direction of scientific knowledge, from the man to the world that
surrounds him or vice versa, different philosophies, one teleological
(sometimes mixed with metaphysics) and the other positive, devel-
oped. The prevalence of an anthropocentric viewmeant that phenome-
nawere interpreted on the basis of extranatural willingness, not natural
laws. According to Comte, the anthropocentric view reconciled the two
perspectives, subordinating the conception of man to that of the exter-
nal andmaterial world (Comte, 1838: 269–271). How did Comte define
life? He considered it to be the condition of the existence of organized
beings or their “double interiormotion, general and continuous, of com-
position and decomposition, which in fact constitutes its true universal
nature” (Comte, 1838: 295). This definition, as Comte himself admitted,
can only be coextensive with the condition of organism/environment
inseparability; it can only suggest the joined double existence of an
organization ready to allow continuous internal renewal and an envi-
ronment capable of absorbing and emitting. In short, the living are
those organisms equipped with a metabolic process.
Each individual organism cannot have a life independent of the envi-
ronment that surrounds it. “Life” is not the property of a particular type
of substance, as the metaphysicists believed. Rather, it is the combina-
tion or the harmonious cooperation of two inseparable elements, the
organism and the environment or milieu (ibid: 289). The living being
and its environment are therefore in a state of mutual cooperation and
dependence. Additionally, the more complex the organism is, the
more complex the environment that surrounds it must be. This princi-
ple is particularly true for human societies, where things and events
are generally remote in time and space. Man cannot live except under
the most complex set of favorable external conditions, both weather
and chemical–physical in nature (ibid: 292). In short, there is no evi-
dence to support the independence of living bodies from their environ-
mental conditions. Of course, organisms are able not only to adapt
passively to the environment but also to interact freely with it, thus
modifying it. From this ability to transform the environment derives
the power of the organism to withstand high levels of variability in
environmental conditions, properties that todaywewould call “systemic
resilience.”
Only a deeply disturbed environment could threaten the living,
simply because the mode of existence of living bodies is clearly charac-
terized by a strong dependence on external influences, both for the
variety of different actions that are required and for the intensity of
each of those actions. Comte therefore rejected both the idea of an
organism's total independence from the environment and the concept
of a body that is passively deformable under the pressure of the sur-
rounding environment, which denies any individual adjustment by
the living. In these words, we can see that Comte positioned himself
between the two poles of vitalism and mechanism.
In a sociological sense, Comte was very skilled at extending the con-
stitutive relation between organism and environment. Once recognized
as necessary for themanifestation of various living phenomena, such as
the corelationship and mutual action between organism and environ-
ment, or in other words metabolism, it was necessary to define the
series of acts or actions that constituted them. According to Comte, itf regulation: The assemblage of environment and society in early social
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manner, the organism–environment indissoluble couple with the idea
of function. Function corresponds to a series of acts or activities by vir-
tue of which not only do the environment's actions change organisms
but changes in the organisms themselves transform their environment.
This reciprocity of action, similar to physical and mechanical action and
reaction complexes, is essentially the function, i.e., the twofold outcome
of the tension between organism and environment (Comte, 1838: 301–
302). Ingenious intuition, which presupposes not only that a number of
interrelated practices between system and environment appear but also
that any change inside the system caused by such actions sets inmotion
further changes in the environment.
Finally Comte noticed his own wavering between a hierarchical
scientism and a stringent anthropocentrism. He believed that the neces-
sary condition that rendered universal progress, both biological and
social, possible was nothing less than the enslavement and control of
inert matter by whole life, in light of an innate social subjectivity. Life
had to reproduce and arise through an exhaustive struggle against inor-
ganicmatter, against nonlivingnature. Here lies Comte's devotion to sci-
entific progress that also constitutes an embryonic governmental
program of societal metabolic processes.
René Worms added some interesting reflection on this issue. For
him, as Comte had already stated, environment was an array of ele-
ments that nature provided to society, which then used those elements
for its own purposes. Physical phenomenawere embedded in social and
biological phenomena (Worms, 1896). Material was the basis of social
and physiological phenomena working as intermediating aspects
between the social and the material. Worms distinguished nonhuman
elements of society into two classes: those that were truly natural and
formed the environment and those that drew their form from human
labor (Worms, 1907: 18–19). Worms identified several elements that
constituted the environment of the social system: the soil on which
society placed its habitat; the subsoil, from which society took various
materials and other organisms to use for food, indirectly contributing
to human foodstuff; and aboveground, with its elements such as atmo-
sphere, rain, solar energy, and the plants and animal organisms, essen-
tial for social life (Worms, 1907: 19–20). Worms noted that the action
of these elements was significant to the point that it was impossible to
believe in social life in the absence of the environment. The social role
attributed to this long series of nonhuman elements was very clear.
The idea that they could be replaced with synthetic inorganic products
was very far away. Neither Worms nor Comte lacked the awareness
that society changes its environment, but it is the way in which society
manipulates, transforms, and uses the environment that indicates the
type of society where we live and what type of individuals belong to
it. The metabolic process in itself is a transforming factor, noted
Worms, but the success or failure of cooperation between a social sys-
tem and its environment depends on the quality of social organization
and the regulation of metabolism itself (Worms, 1907: 29–30).
Although he was a strong supporter of extreme liberalism, the bio-
psycho-sociological system developed by Herbert Spencer undoubtedly
had a metabolic character. Spencer believed in a close correlation
between plant and animal life, recognizable in the correlation between
the amounts of energy expended by each animal species and the
amount of energy emitted by plants during oxidation (Spencer, 1880:
182). This general law of energy transformation and equivalence con-
cerned both vital and social forces. In fact, Spencer's main idea was
that social forces were strictly correlated with physical forces, mediated
by vital forces.
Everything that occurs in a society is due to organic or inorganic
agencies, or a combination of the two; either from undirected physical
forces, from those physical forces directed by men, or from the forces
of the men themselves. According to Spencer, a clear demonstration of
the correlation between living and social phenomena is provided by
the influence of population on the features of society that it helped
form. The larger the population, the larger and more diverse the set ofPlease cite this article as: Padovan, D., Metabolic exchanges and practices o
sciences, Ecological Informatics (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoinfsocial practices exhibited by the system. Similarly, social activity varies
based on the size of the supply of organic and inorganic matter from
the environment. Abundant natural resources obviously have a positive
influence on the complex profile of society through increasing the
organism's social activities and complexity (Spencer, 1880: 189–190).
According to Spencer, the efficiency and extent of social metabolism
determines societal wealth, and where resources are not obtainable
from already-colonized land, they are imported from other regions at
the expense of other forces and energies. The indifference of the
consumption of energy and materials to the place from which those
resources are drawn was already clear, along with the fact that all soci-
eties have the never-ending supply of energy appropriated by living
organisms: solar energy. The specific ability of human society is to be
able to use and appropriate even the most subtle and difficult-to-find
sources of energy, such as coal, wind or water, using tools and tech-
niques invented by the human species. Societal prosperity can only
depend on the prosperity of the life forces that surround it and which
provide the elements necessary for its development. However, at the
same time these same forces limit the movement of the social system's
growth and expansion, the boundary beyondwhich resistance becomes
stronger and stronger as well as more and more complex (Spencer,
1880: 240).
The Spencerian dilemma lies in the absence of a theory of the limit,
or rather in adhering to the anthropocentric idea of continuous growth
of the social organism at the expense of other species and other human
societies. This is where the biosociological Spencerian evolutionism,
distorting Darwin's assumptions, takes shape, fueling the idea of an
incessant effort to move the boundaries between society and the envi-
ronment in an effort to permanently colonize the natural and social
environments.
Natural selection was initially conceived as the process of an
organism's adjustment to its environment. At that time, it seemed that
the same principle could be applied to the social phenomena of
human life. From this perspective, according to Spencer, human society
is considered to result from natural causes broad enough to include the
cosmic process. As Lilienfeld suggested, social improvements occur only
when the adjustment process is both incessant and dynamic. If the
metabolic process stops or goes too fast, society jeopardizes its own
reproduction. Human society, like any organism, adapts to ceaseless
environmental variations. It harmonizes not only with natural environ-
mentalmodifications such as climate, food and vegetation but also with
the new conditions produced by psychosociological activity and eco-
nomic actions. These activities create an artificial environment, different
but still linked to the natural environment (Lilienfeld, 1896).
Society does not have its own laws that differ from natural ones,
argued Giddings, and sociology must give an account of the origins,
growth, and structuration of society from the point of view of the joint
evolution of natural and social phenomena (Giddings, 1896). Sociolo-
gists such as Giddings naively believed that the laws of social evolution
are the same laws that govern natural evolution. In fact, some processes
and mechanisms, such as integration and differentiation, or the transi-
tion from disorganized homogeneity to organized heterogeneity, are
formally and analogically found in both fields of life. The basic idea is
that the adaptation of a society to its environment is harmonious, pain-
less, and completely irenic, like the laws of nature. If there are changes,
they aim to achieve equilibrium, as in the case of thermodynamic laws
based on the universal tendency to balance energy between bodies.
Thus, the ideas of social “static” and “dynamic” were considered com-
plementary disciplines for the study of equilibrium and social change.
Their final synthesis is found in the Spencerian “dynamic equilibrium”,
i.e., the continuous processes of adaptation between system and envi-
ronment to achieve a balance.
However, society does not act like nature. Society takes possession of
nature through practices, processes, and mechanisms that emulate
natural ones only initially, and then turn away permanently. Society
converts and replaces the natural process of evolution in an artificialf regulation: The assemblage of environment and society in early social
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process becomes teleologically progressive, and is ideally no longer
physically guided by certain compelling “ideas-force” (Fouillée, 1890,
1905). Here, sociology discovers the need to combine two major per-
spectives: the objective related to the physical, and the subjective related
to the social will. A true sociology, argued Giddings, must combine
objective and subjective interpretations. The metabolic evolution of
society necessarily leads to a distinction, which would mean replacing
the primordial driving forces of physical nature, necessary for the estab-
lishment of society, with social forces. In the case of Giddings, it is the
consciousness of species, a central phenomenon of social life, which
allows the various stages of human evolution to remain connected.
Inmore analytical terms, species consciousness is formed by anasso-
ciation of individual minds that belong to human societies, as argued by
LesterWard (1884).Modes of association arising out of the combination
of minds comprise a new environment for individuals, a medium that
lies between the individual consciousness of species and the outer
world of nature. Outlined in this passage is the primary interface
between society and nature, a psychosocial system that remains depen-
dent on outside nature, but imperceptibly and gradually emancipates
itself from material needs, building a first distinction between inside
and outside, between us and the other (Giddings, 1896: 25). In this
way, social activities are able to create a “wonderful structure” of exter-
nal relations that acts causally on the environment by modifying
the surface of the earth. For the first time, the process of adaptation
becomes unbalanced in favor of society, announcing the decoupling of
society and nature.
In this first stage, relationships between society and nature were
seen by sociologists as a slow but inescapable process by which society
constitutes itself. However, soon society begins to emancipate itself
from physical nature. The rise of political and economic institutions,
along with technical and organizational configurations, made available
the rise of social systems at the expenses of natural ones. Sociologists
believed that from the samepoint of departure, evolution leads to a sep-
aration between nature and society. According to Spencer, industrial
progress not only exhibits a compound acceleration resulting from an
increase in operative forces but also exhibits further acceleration
resulting from a decrease in resistance by natural and physical elements
(Spencer, 1900: 327). The ability of a social system to maintain a func-
tional balance with the environment is a matter either of organization
and cooperation or of social consciousness and driving ideas.
3. Metabolism between mechanism and finalism
The affirmation of positivism and materialism during the 19th
century led to a fracture in the natural and social sciences between
vitalism or finalism and mechanism or physicalism. As set forth below,
this fracture divided both natural and social scientists. According to,
e.g., Haeckel, reproduction, adaptation and nourishment are biological
functions of organisms that deny every teleological, spiritual and vitalist
interpretation of organic life, although they are understandable in light
of amechanical and physicochemical conception (Haeckel, 1866, 1900).
Comte's position existed between the two extremes of vitalism and
materialism. Materialists exaggerated the subordination of biology to
the simpler parts of natural philosophy, and went so far as to assign
the study of life to the appendix of the general systemof inorganic phys-
ics. Vitalists' consequent reaction resulted in the development of a
metaphysical doctrine of physiology. The strength of their metaphysical
dogma resided in its recognition of physiology as a distinct science,
whereas the strength of physicochemical dogma resided in its principle
of the dependence of organic on inorganic laws. He also believed that
vitalism and materialism were connected to ideological and political
movements—to reactionary and revolutionarymovements, respectively
(Comte, 1838: 648–649).
Recent concepts of metabolism seem closer to the mechanicist
approach than to the teleological one. Whereas metabolism refers to aPlease cite this article as: Padovan, D., Metabolic exchanges and practices o
sciences, Ecological Informatics (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoinfcomplex process of metabolic exchange, whereby an organism (or a
cell) draws upon materials and energy from its environment and
converts them, using various metabolic reactions, into the building
blocks of proteins and other compounds necessary for growth (Fischer-
Kowalski, 1998), here we are confronted by a nonteleological definition.
Although it is said that metabolism refers to the internal processes of a
living organism that needs energy-rich, low-entropy materials (food)
both to provide for its own maintenance and functions and to permit
growth and reproduction, excreting and exhaling waste output con-
sisting of degraded, high-entropy materials, we still face a physicalist
and thermodynamic definition.
The rise of metabolism as a paradigm to interpret the relationship
between society and nature alludes to the old ontological fracture
between teleology and mechanism, which in the field of social sciences
is represented by the opposition between constructionism and realism
(materialism). In its most general sense, materialism asserts that both
the origin and development of what exists is dependent on nature and
‘matter’ (Swyngedouw, 2006). In other words, a certain physical reality
exists prior to thought and to which thought must be related or
interlinked (although it can never be identical to the real) (Foster,
2000). Moreover, we cannot overlook that somehow a nonhuman
world could provide a foundational level of social morals and human
ethics (Bookchin, 1992; Padovan, 1999, 2003). Themorally good, the so-
cially right, and the esthetically beautiful, are all understood as derived
from certain physiological functions of associate living organisms. They
are no longer the result of an abstract categorical imperative but of con-
crete social, nonhuman and human, practices (Bauman, 1993;
Kropotkin, 1924).
Hans Driesch was one of the more prominent biologists and philos-
ophers to promote vitalism in biology and claim the self-oriented orga-
nization of living organisms. He saw entelecheia as an organizing power
(Driesch, 1908: 16). The main question of vitalism is how order can
reconstruct itself from disturbance and whether the processes of life
can properly be called purposive. According to Driesch, to describe a
process as purposive, it must be connected with the idea of an end. It
is thereby implied that the concept of teleology extends to many pro-
cesses of very different types, and also that it is initially limited to the
organic, at least insofar as so-called natural objects in the narrower
sense are concerned. Relation to an end implies two things: first, the
special adaptation of the process in question to an end (or better, its
position in a system of objects thus typically adapted); and second, its
appearance in an indefinite number of individuals or examples, in
short, its unlimited plurality. This postulates that nature is fulfilled in
organic natural bodies, and at first, only in them. We can therefore
describe many biological processes as purposive (Driesch, 1914, p. 3).
However, despite Driesch's attempt to give living systems a purpo-
sive character (for example, in the light of the process of adaptation),
it is unquestionable that a profound difference remains between the
two even though one might say that there would be no consciousness
or social life without (biological) life. There is a sharp distinction be-
tween meaning and life as different principles of organization.
In the case of a living organism, the exchange of matter and energy
with the environment is oriented to a simple nonteleological reproduc-
tion of the organism itself. Modalities of recovery and transformation of
the necessary elements for the reproduction of the organism's life
change very slowly in time; above all, when they reach a balance, they
aremaintained over time. As the sociologist Eugenio Rignanohas stated,
the life and metabolism of cellular organisms are built up and main-
tained through a series of mechanical movements, through circulation
and osmoses of liquid and gaseous substances, and through chemical
reactions—all carried out within a mechanism of extremely complex
structure. This mechanism tends to remain almost immutable during a
long life-period, precisely because these vital phenomena have as
their principal function the maintenance of the organism in as stable a
condition as possible rather than the modification of the mechanism
(Rignano, 1928).f regulation: The assemblage of environment and society in early social
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to continuous growth.Most social scientists have commented that there
are no limits to the growth of a whole social system. The metabolic
process between society and nature should provide structures made
up of the survivingmaterial products of humanity'swork. Political econ-
omy denotes this ensemble by the word “capital”: e.g., private dwell-
ings, public edifices, cultivation of the soil, industrial establishments,
machines, raw materials for industry, chattels for the satisfaction of
the human needs, roads, bridges, and canals. The totality of these infra-
structures might be designated as the artificial telluric factor or the
physical-technical structure (Rignano, 1928). Indeed, in social systems
meaning, consciousness, power, coordination and communication are
mingled to build a purpose-oriented reproduction of a system itself,
aspects that are not contemplated by living systems. Social systems reg-
ulate their ownmetabolismswith different tools that change over time:
religions, wars, laws,wealth, techniques, and other typically social tools.
As Maurice Godelier suggests, in contrast to other social animals,
human beings do not just live in society, they produce society for the
purpose of living. In the course of their existence, they invent new
ways of thinking and of acting—both upon themselves and upon the
nature that surrounds them—therefore producing culture and creating
history. Human beings have a history because they transform nature
(Godelier, 1986).
The asymmetrical evolution of social and natural systems poses the
problem of the impossible temporal and ontological synchrony be-
tween them. Thus, we need a definition of metabolism that combines
blind mechanisms and intentionality, purposelessness and teleology,
and humans and nonhuman agents' reproduction. On a systemic level,
i.e., the phylogenetic level, this definition might foster a science of
metabolic processes. All of the social processes and practices that
make societal metabolism possible, their variable combinations, their
characteristics of exteriority, heterogeneity and contingent necessity
(obligatoriness), might be seen as an assemblage that goes beyond the
functional andmechanical category of “industrialmetabolism” as devel-
oped over the last twenty years (Ayres, 1989; Ayres and Simonis, 1994;
Greadel and Allenby, 1995; Janssen, and van den Bergh, 1999; Janssen
et al., 2001). In a certain sense, we can say that blind mechanisms and
teleological purposes are to be considered using a dialectical and coevo-
lutionary approach, as both interconnected and reciprocally influenced.
4. Early attempts to develop a science of metabolic processes
Whereas early social scientists easily dealt with physical nature,
contemporary sociologists still struggle to investigate interfaces
among society, nature and matter so as to understand an object
of research, the nonhuman nature, that could justify a sociological
approach. Perhaps the cultural constructivism of social sciences is not
enough to understand and imagine society's course. Sociology is con-
cerned with understanding environmental problems as socially con-
structed “dilemmas”, but in doing so it diverts attention from the
connections between social practices and ecological changes. Material,
natural and nonhuman facts must enter the analysis.
The decoupling of society and nature was not previously included in
writing about the evolution of social sciences. Sociologists such as Émile
Durkheim and Max Weber, even though they reached the conclusion
that modern social organisms are not only very different from plant
and animal organisms but also that society and naturemust be separated
at the level of theoretical and empirical investigation, were at the same
time aware that social science must admit nonhumans into its field of
research.
In a very caustic overviewofWilhelmOstwald's book on social ener-
getics (Ostwald, 1909), Max Weber observed, “Although the foregoing
observations might have given the impression that I believe the ener-
getic viewpoint to be completely unfruitful for our discipline, this is
not my view. It is entirely proper at some time to take into account
the physical and chemical balance sheets of technical and economicalPlease cite this article as: Padovan, D., Metabolic exchanges and practices o
sciences, Ecological Informatics (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoinfdevelopmental processes… We could benefit from his discussions as
well, and certainly his general comment that it is necessary to take
into account all of the statements that result from the application of
the laws of energy to social phenomenon, deserves our unreserved
agreement” (Weber, 1984, 49–50; see also Martinez-Alier, 1987, pp.
183–92). There Weber acknowledged that contribution by the physical
sciences was needed to understand social phenomena, but in all of his
own work, he insisted on the functional separation of the social and
natural realms.
Émile Durkheim sculpted a sociology in which the constraint of
social facts exercised upon individuals seems very analogous to the
natural facts shaping societies. Moreover, he was aware, as were all of
his contemporary sociologists, that physical conditions shape societal
evolution. However, he built a sociology in which the social was clearly
separated from the natural. Durkheim claimed a very clear and rightful
distinction between these two types of coercion from the physical and
social worlds: “There is a world of difference separating a physical
from amoral environment. The pressure exerted by one or several bod-
ies on other bodies or even on other wills should not be confused with
that which the group consciousness exercises on the consciousness of
its members. What is exclusively peculiar to social constraint is that it
stems not from the unyieldingness of certain patterns of molecules,
but from the prestige with which certain representations are endowed”
(Durkheim, 1982 [orig. 1893]). Consequently, he could claim, “even if
every individual drinks, sleeps, eats, or employs his reason, and society
has every interest in seeing that these functions are regularly exercised,
these are not social facts. If therefore these facts were social ones, soci-
ology would possess no subject matter peculiarly its own, and its
domain would be confused with that of biology and psychology”.
According to Durkheim, there is in every society a clearly determined
group of phenomena that are separable, due to their distinct character-
istics, from those that form the subject matter of other natural sciences.
Here, he states that there is a stable separation between natural and
social phenomena.
When considering complex societies and nature, they have been
studied in the light of a one-way causality from social to natural
(Murphy, 1995). Early social scientists often considered human systems
to be embedded in natural ecosystems; however, for contemporary
social sciences that share the paradigm that separates the social from
the natural, is normal to consider the latter as part of the overall social
system. This approach typically scrutinizes the environmental impacts
produced by human activity and the increase in external risks, but in
doing so it externalizes the wisdom of the natural domain. A more real-
istic view should not only claim that the “natural” is deeply involved in
all social forms (Williams, 1980) but also that social systems (or global
capitalist systems) are primarily ecological regimes that aim to appro-
priate natural resources as if they were free gifts (Moore, 2011) and
that are increasingly reliant on the nonhuman world. As proposed by
Michel Goldman, it is not only society that should be investigated as
constitutive of nature and vice versa but also naturemust be understood
as an actor with a materiality that is sometimes joined with and some-
times autonomous from society (Goldman and Schurman, 2000). In
otherwords, just as socially constructed truths help legitimize and facil-
itate the appropriation of nature, so do changes in materiality alter the
way in which societies construct truths. For instance, the availability
of cheap oil fosters myths of unlimited material abundance and growth
(Redclift, 2009). Themetabolic approachmight present sociologywith a
valid alternative for reassembling society and nature.
Defining society as a metabolic systemmight be considered to be an
undeserved simplification because it risks hiding singularities in the
cauldron of statistics relative to the appropriation, transformation,
consumption, and ejection of natural resources. However, the fact of
using such an analogy to give an account of the functioning of a social
system is theoretically plausible (Burkett, 1999; Dickens, 2004; Fischer-
Kowalski and Haberl, 1998; Foster, 1999; Haberl et al., 2004; Hayward,
1994; Moore, 2000; York et al., 2003).f regulation: The assemblage of environment and society in early social
.2014.02.006
6 D. Padovan / Ecological Informatics xxx (2014) xxx–xxxStudying the society/nature complex from the metabolic point of
view inserts into the old abstract knowledge of nature formalized by
natural sciences and based on analogical thought amateriality and real-
ism that resides in the space/time sphere of human practices. Neither
people nor scientists are the producers of the abstract knowledge of
nature, but their mutual actions on the frame of the temporal sphere
comprehend nature itself. The materialism of this approach derives
from the assumption that human history belongs to natural history
and is dominated by material necessities. When these necessities
take a social or socialized form mediated by human labor, nature is
prolonged in the form of human history (Sohn-Rethel, 1978).
Due to this historical trait, social metabolism undergoes continu-
ous transformations. It implies not only a quantitative study of the
exchanges that take place between society and the natural environment
(we do not discuss other societal environments, such as individual
minds) but also an analysis of both changing agents and sociotechnical
arrays that occur inmetabolic exchange, making such an exchange pos-
sible. These assemblages of agents and attendantsmight be called infra-
structures, which are the principal interfaces between culture and
nature, “the boundary across which the ecological, chemical, and phys-
ical restraints towhich human action is subject interact with the princi-
pal sociocultural practices aimed at overcoming or modifying those
restraints” (Harris, 1979: 57).
Given the set of practices, knowledge, and artifacts that constitute
the social infrastructure that makes metabolism possible, it is notable
that there is almost no sociology ofmetabolicmechanismand exchange,
i.e., the manner in which social agents of any type (governments,
markets, communities, groups, experts, companies, organizations, and
households) manage, manipulate, produce and consume nature. The
study of themetabolic profile of the systems that we consider and prac-
tices put in place to transformmatter and energy into objects to be con-
sumed tells us a great deal about the characteristics of those systems
(York et al., 2003; Martinez-Alier, 2004). The metabolic perspective
gives us an analytical understanding of society that reintroduces the
“material” in the sociological reflection. As previously noted, Frédéric
Le Play, reconciling the human need for socialization and quality of life
depends on the “productive energy of natural forces” (Le Play, 1879,
vol. I: 79).
A sociology of metabolic processes has already been designed, not
only at a theoretical level but also at the level of operational complexity.
In an unknown book dedicated to statistics (Geddes, 1881, cf. Also
Martinez-Alier, 1987), the zoologist and botanist Patrick Geddes
proposed to classify social facts according to a modality very similar to
the metabolic perspective that we discuss here. According to Geddes,
first a society exists within certain limits of time and space; second, it
consists of a given number of living organisms; third, those organisms
change nature around them, essentially appropriating part of its matter
and energy; and fourth, they use this material and energy for sustaining
their lives, for example, to support their physiological functions. Geddes
defined these propositions as “sociological axioms”, principles that not
only constitute detailed indicators for the identification of the metabolic
profile of a society to set up an input–outputmodel as has been suggested
by Martinez-Alier (2004) but are also able to implement important
knowledge bases for the foundation of a materialist sociology. These ax-
ioms allowed classifying the social facts as follows (Geddes, 1881, p. 12):
• Those relating to the limits of time and space occupied by a given
society.
• Those relating to the natural matter and energy utilized by that
society.
• Those relating to the organisms composing the society.
• Those relating to the application of the utilized matter and energy by
the given organisms.
It is clear that no attempt is made by Geddes to completely define
a society. A societymaybemuchmore than all of this, inwhich casemorePlease cite this article as: Padovan, D., Metabolic exchanges and practices o
sciences, Ecological Informatics (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoinfgeneral truths are discoverable, but in any case these four generalizations
are obviously true, neither hypothesis nor metaphysical principles being
involved. Henceforth, these generalizations are denoted as sociological
axioms.
The classification of social facts suggested by Geddes has little to do
with the similar definition of “social fact” that Durkheim proposed
twenty years later, which is totally based on sociocultural and organiza-
tional phenomena, aspects of sociological analysis that must not be
excluded. The proposal of Geddes is almost completely oriented to-
wards recognizing the use of land and environment, alongwithmeasur-
ing their scarcity due to natural events or social actions such as the
discovery, conquest, or colonization of land. Even the consumption of
energy and matter constitutes an objective measurement because
they are considered the main modes through which raw material and
energy are transformed into objects to be consumed. The process of
the transformation of raw materials identified by Geddes is generally
composed of three stages: the first, called exploitation, includes agricul-
ture, mining and applied engineering; the second is that of manufactur-
ing; and the third is that of movement by agencies of transport and
exchange to the place where the rawmaterials are ultimately provided
to fulfill society's desires for protection, alimentation, and nervous stim-
ulus. Geddes added one final form of the consumption of raw material
present inmore complex societies, “intermediate products,”which con-
cern the conversion equipment involved in the service of exploitation,
manufacturing and transport. An important part of energy and matter
is thus dissipated in the course of various stages of production without
being directly used and therefore lost. Here there is already a clear
idea of the indirect consumption of energy and materials associated
with the consumption of goods and primary products, and this con-
sumption is classified on the basis of different forms of an organism's
adaptation to its environment.
The fact that adaptation becomes dominion remains a vivid issue.
Modern systems theory has somehow revived the Spencerian tradition
that sees the environment not only as a resource to care for but also a
complex of physical resistance to overcome and break down in the
logic of competition for the expansion and growth of dominant systems.
These positions are obviously not unique, but we can say that the social
system is the dominant actor in a set of asymmetrical relationships
between a system and its environment. The system is the subject that
reduces the complexity of the environment to stay alive,whichdescribes
the environment for its ownpurposes, which acts on the environment to
reduce its own uncertainty, which projects the internal chaos to regain
stability onto the environment.
However, in doing so, a system creates the conditions for an increase
in its own uncertainty. From the sociological perspective, the system
appropriates its environment exclusively for its own purposes, creating
a curtain of ignorance about the consequences of subtracting the
environment's life-support systems. A metabolic vision has the poten-
tial to overcome the neo-social-Darwinism or sociobiological approach,
to develop a critical sociology of the processes of appropriating and col-
onizing nature.
4.0.0.1. Human labor as metabolic activator. Albert Schäffle is among the
sociologists who best interpreted social metabolism. Coming from the
school of the so-called “socialism of the chair”, he believed that each
activity of a social body's components—small or large—presupposes a
“fund” (Vorrath) of labor in the form of people and goods. Any concrete
work consumes a part of this “fund” of force, necessitating renewal. The
social body thus demands an exchange of matter through all of the
social body's parts and functions: production, circulation, distribution,
exchange, and the use and disposal of materials necessary for maintain-
ing personal and institutional social units (Schäffle, 1896).
Indeed, continued Schäffle, every day an immensemass of themate-
rials and the energy of nature are, through labor, appropriated by the
social body to be adapted to its needs through production and then
distributed to the social body's various parts through circulation;f regulation: The assemblage of environment and society in early social
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by both institutions and individuals, and returned into the lap of nature
through the consumption of goods and bodily forces. Thus, Schäffle
clearly outlined the mechanism of social metabolism by means of
which energy and matter that exist in nature enable the social body to
maintain itself. Furthermore, the exchange of materials not only serves
as ameans of conserving the bio-organic substratum of society, i.e., con-
serving biological bodies, it is also indispensable for maintaining the
extraorganic parts of the social body, i.e., the functions of social life,
the spiritual, religious, cultural and symbolic aspects that cannot exist
without an exchange of materials. Although still at an elementary
stage, Schäffle recognized and very clearly described the ecological in-
terdependence of society and nature.
The economic and physiological exchange ofmaterial does not entail
the destruction of material and energy, but rather, entails their reorga-
nization into sources of energy and institutions, whichmake their social
use possible. Essentially, Schäffle applied thermodynamic principles to
social exchanges. According to these principles, energy and matter are
not destroyed, but are only transformed, disorganized and then
reorganized for other uses. An efficientmechanism of socialmetabolism
can neither allow any energy to be lost nor permit increasing entropy;
the result would be a crisis within the social organism itself.
Schäffle distinguished between a progressive and a regressive
exchange ofmaterials ormatter. The former corresponds to the produc-
tion andmanipulation of rawmaterials; the second to the consumption
and elimination of used materials (i.e., waste/rubbish/garbage). This
distinction renders the social exchange of material that is carried out
by the human community unique, different from that of animals and
plants. Although the organic process of transformingmaterials is similar
in humans and other animals at the bodily level, Schäffle quite rightly
argued that the social economics of the exchange of materials is very
different from the natural economy of exchange as practiced by other
organisms.
The economic regulation of social metabolism depends on the con-
scious, societally developed needs and reasons. According to Schäffle,
socially manipulated goods, other than raw materials, contain a quid
of uniqueness, spirituality, rationality, work and social techniques that
make them completely different from the goods required for animal
life. Traces of Marxist thought seem to hover around these words.
Work makes the social exchange of materials possible and work is, at
a high level, conscious, spiritual, and guided by rationality. The rational
activity of intelligence, feeling, and will, makes nature's energy and
matter available to humans, modifying, disorganizing and reorganizing
both energy and matter to meet humanity's specific needs. Thanks to
agriculture and animal husbandry, the same process for the production
of food rationally dominates nature's entire organic kingdom: nutrition
becomes both rational agriculture and culinary art.
I do not wish to advance this reflection on Schäffle's social metabo-
lism any further: it speaks for itself. I only wish to add to concepts that
Schäffle used to explain social economy. The first of these concepts is
nature, which he meant as a “font or spring” and as the “place of dejec-
tion/evacuation” for the exchange of matter. Nature was one of the
three factors of production identified by Schäffle that can be associated
with labor and capital (Schäffle, 1896: 974). Nature demonstrated two
contrasting aspects in its relation with social labor: on the one hand,
resistance to the use of its resources and energy which had to be over-
come through the rational intelligence of human beings; on the other,
however, nature could be of help to society without this help having
to be exchanged with social labor. Schäffle here referred to light, heat,
rain, and the air we breathe, that is, a group of “free goods” (res com-
munes) that have recently been defined as “services supplied free of
charge by the ecological systems of society for the proper functioning
of the support system of life on Earth”. The second concept is that of
scarcity. For Schäffle, both quantitative scarcity and the qualitative lack
of natural resources are the basis of all need, and thus of the social econ-
omy of exchange, which is effectively a complex means of satisfyingPlease cite this article as: Padovan, D., Metabolic exchanges and practices o
sciences, Ecological Informatics (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoinfneeds. The third concept is that of labor, in the broadest physical mean-
ing of the word: every effort made by living forces, every use of this
living force. According to Schäffle, the labor of every person and every
service (utility) supplied by a thing, every service and every personal
use, is labor. This definition is quite close to that of Lilienfeld. For
him, labor is the combination of the physiological forces of natural
organisms and the forces of human bodies or, to use another formula,
the combination of matter and force (Lilienfeld, 1896).
The metabolism pattern is only a fragment of the complex structure
of Schäffle's sociological theory. That theory does not addmuch towhat
Spencer previously outlined, but it provided a new reading corner with
the goal of incorporating the reality of the social body into a synthetic
system analogy. The distinction between Spencer and Schäffle is per-
haps more subtle, as Albion Small commented: “The difference reduces
to this: Spencer does not succeed inmaking his interpretation of society
picture it as more than an organization of mechanisms. Schäffle's central
conception of society is of an organization of work” (Small, 1905: 167).
Although mechanism implies work and work implies mechanism, it is
interesting to note that the extension of the concept of “function”,
which was used by Schäffle to represent metabolic and reproductive
work and was closely related to energy and matter consumption, puts
his work on a higher plane than that of Spencer. In short, Schäffle
outlined not only “how” men and women are associated but also
“what men and women do” through these structures.
5. Labor as practice for assembling society and nature
The thoughts of Schäffle, Small and Worms enable us to open the
chapter on social labor, practice and activity as the unique medium
between society and nature. Socialmetabolismor the resource through-
put between physical nature and human society is activated and mobi-
lized by labor. As suggested by Swyngedouw (2006), the metabolic
process is energized by fusing the physical properties and creative
capacities of humans with those of nonhumans. It is through labor
that raw materials are transformed into use values and are given a
specific exchange value due to their capacity to be exchanged. As Marx
suggested,without inputs of concrete labor (or energy to drivemachines
that replace concrete labor) there is no metabolism.
“The labor process, as we have just presented it in its simple and
abstract elements, is purposeful activity aimed at the production of
use-values. It is an appropriation of what exists in nature for the
requirements of man. It is the universal condition for the metabolic
interaction [Stoffwechsel] between man and nature, the everlasting
nature-imposed condition of human existence, and it is therefore in-
dependent of every form of that existence, or rather it is common to
all forms of society in which human beings live”. (Marx, 1976 (orig.
1867): 290)
Although labor changes over time, it remains the main action that
appropriates and transforms naturewhile producingwealth. First, labor
is an appropriative action implied in practices of selecting, extracting
and relocating natural elements, putting them at the disposal of other
practices (Benton, 1989). The array of services freely provided bynature
and freely appropriable and usable by society (such as biomass or nitro-
gen) can be counted as pure appropriation. These ecosystem services,
which have become a diffuse concept for attracting attention to societal
dependence on ecological life-support systems (Daily, 1997; De Groot
et al., 2002; Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010), provide one of the clearest
examples of the free metabolic exchange between society and nature.
As suggested by Marx:
“All of those things that labormerely separates from immediate con-
nection with their environment are objects of labor spontaneously
provided by nature, such as fish caught and separated from their
natural element, namely water, timber felled in virgin forests, and
ores extracted from their veins” (Marx, 1976 (orig. 1867): 284)f regulation: The assemblage of environment and society in early social
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sustain or regulate the environmental conditions under which seeds
or stock animals grow and develop. There is a transformative moment
in these labor processes, but the transformations are brought about by
natural organic mechanisms, not by the application of human labor
(Benton, 1989, 67–68). Finally, we have a concept of the labor process,
central to which is the notion of a raw material undergoing a transfor-
mation to yield a use value. This transformation is the outcome of
human labor that involves the utilization of raw materials and instru-
ments of labor to achieve its purpose. The process involves both human
intentional activity and a range of distinct materials, substances and
other nonhuman beings and conditions.
Even though these distinctions are useful for analysis, it is apparent
that under capitalistic conditions, these types of labor are all distinctive-
ly human rather than purely natural and unmediated forms of activity in
that, in their human forms, are intentional, socially organized and usu-
ally involve the use of tools such as techniques, science, and expert
knowledge (Sayers, 2007).
In this view, labor is a peculiar and vexing variety of human activity,
a special act that makes society an organized and oriented texture of
functional human activities performed by human agents. Labor is em-
bedded in complex arrays of human activities that we call practices.
Practice is the intentional and oriented transformation of matter and
of living organisms' reproduction.Wemight say that labor is an activity
and practice that is special and transformative, the transformative
taking on the world. In Marxist terms, practice is human action that
involves the transformation and conservation of matter (Foster, 2000).
All practices produce something. In the purely material dimension,
because practices always require some material as an input, they also
produce somethingmaterial as an output (Ollinaho, 2012)Material pro-
duction is Marx's very starting point:
“Labor is, first of all, a process betweenman and nature, a process by
which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and con-
trols the metabolism between himself and nature. He confronts the
materials of nature as a force of nature. He sets inmotion the natural
forces that belong to his own body, his arms, legs, head andhands, to
appropriate the materials of nature in a form adapted to his own
needs. Through this movement he acts upon external nature and
changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own
nature.” (Marx, 1976 (orig. 1867): 283).“In the labor process, there-
fore, man's activity, via the instruments of labor, effects an alteration
in the object of labor that was intended from the outset. The process
is extinguished in the product. The product of the process is a use-
value, a piece of natural material adapted to human needs by means
of a change in its form. Labor has become bound up in its object:
labor has been objectified, the object has been worked on.” (Marx,
1976 (orig. 1867): 287)
The conditions of recruitment, provision and organization of labor
have changed over time. As suggested by Robert Kurz, in contrast to pre-
modern societies, the “process of metabolism with nature” is no longer
codified by religious traditions and traditional grammars, but is now
mediated through the mechanism of the market, which progressively
incorporates the whole relation to nature by the process of abstracting
the commodity form. Capitalism entails the transformation of themate-
rial and substantive content of reproduction into “abstract things”,
whose phenomenal form is money indifferent to that content. Paradox-
ically, the process of abstraction of labor renders men much more
dependent on social relations within the “process of metabolism with
nature” than they were in premodern society, which was characterized
by small, autarchic units of production (Kurz, 1994).
If metabolism is nothing more than the continuous process of
assembling and reassembling past and present matter and labor,
where labor is energy transferred to a human organism by means of
nourishing matter, under capitalist social relations the separation ofPlease cite this article as: Padovan, D., Metabolic exchanges and practices o
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new forms of exploitation. While separation is at work it allows the
forced unity of the society/nature complex ascribed by dualistic ways
of thinking to each term. Thus, under the term “production of nature”,
we can see the dialectical movement between separation and unifica-
tion of the society/nature complex (Benton, 2001; Castree, 2001;
Moore, 2009).
The subsuming process arises, as Kurz notes, out of a blind social
machine for the abstract utilization of labor power that tends to absorb
within its vacant movement man, nature and everything else that it
touches, directing them and later evacuating them into the other dead
form of labor and matter without adding any other qualitative end.
This social machine must put material quality into motion: raw mate-
rials, natural forces and living human labor; such qualities, however,
do not constitute a goal nor do they produce any end by themselves,
they are only means in the tautological and self-referential process of
abstract labor. There is, therefore, a reversal of the means and the
ends: labor is no longer a means towards the qualitative end of the
appropriation of nature, but on the contrary, the qualitative andmaterial
appropriation of nature is only an indifferent means for the process of
changing the form of abstract labor as an end in itself (Kurz, 1991).
Currently we can speak of complex systems of appropriation of
materials, energy and labor from nature (physical, nonhuman and
human nature) and of systems that transform the latter to provide
goods, commodities and services indifferent to their uses. Here, labor
and nature appear as objects of manipulation separated and detached
from the social realm. A careful examination might suggest the idea
that these systems of appropriation/provision are primarily practical
systems in which expert organization and knowledge are the leading
players that rule huge arrays of social labor and knowledge enacted by
individuals connected through different social configurations. These
systems of routinized practices are very important for social sciences,
as suggested by Giddens:
“The basic domain of the study of the social sciences, according to
the theory of structuration, is neither the experience of the individ-
ual actor nor the existence of any form of societal totality, but social
practices ordered across space and time” (Giddens, 1984: 2).
As Giddens suggests, through social practices that are reproduced
across time and space, agents generate patterns of social relations that
are characterized as social systems. In and through their activities,
agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible.
Social systems are thus relations among actors, organized as recursive
social practices and reproduced and transformed by the actors. Systems
are said to have structural properties or institutionalized features, giving
‘solidity’ across time and space (p. 24).
However, Giddens forgets that expert managements and organiza-
tions are the true rulers of these social practices and of socialmetabolism.
Human labor, practices and activities, which are the main interface that
allows society to appropriate and transform nature, are prevalently
ruled and mobilized by expert organizations. These organizations set
up the way in which nature is transformed, accumulated, produced,
and colonized for the purpose of satisfying the needs of driving economic
forces that provide consumers with continuing changing use-values and
amarket of exchange-values. These systems of exchange between nature
and society are planned and regulated by these expert organizations
based on technical knowledge, expert practices and labor and scientific
and rational knowledge. These types of activities and expert practices
are more rational and scope oriented than are those practices ruled by
habits and recursiveness. Expert systems are systems of technical accom-
plishment or professional expertise that organize large areas of themate-
rial and social environments in which we live today and that organize
almost the totality of social metabolism. In short, expert systems are
systems of technical accomplishment or professional expertise that orga-
nize and rule large areas of the material and social environments inf regulation: The assemblage of environment and society in early social
.2014.02.006
9D. Padovan / Ecological Informatics xxx (2014) xxx–xxxwhichwe live today (Giddens, 1990). Oncemore, we find the earth to be
a universal instrument, for it furnishes a locus standi to labor and a field
of employment for its activity (Goodman, 1999).
6. Metabolism as appropriation
The process of appropriation of nature is neither neutral nor natural.
It is a purposeful process that is mediated, as we have seen, by social
labor, which means a complex array of scientific and common knowl-
edge, technical and communicative tools. The process by which human
society appropriates nature for its own ends is completely different
from the process by which other living organisms take possession of
the same natural resources. Furthermore, different historical societies
appropriate nature with different tools, goals and reasons. However,
the “problem of appropriation” is a mixed social/natural mixed, with
all of its scientific, political and moral implications.
All scholars agree that from a historical perspective, society/nature
metabolism is the particular form inwhich societies establish andmain-
tain their material input from and output to nature; i.e., the mode in
which they organize and regulate the exchange of matter and energy
with their natural environment (Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 1994;
see also Ayres, 1989; Ayres and Simonis, 1994; Ayres, 1997; Janssen
et al., 2001; Erkman, 1997).
However, at the level of its historical forms, social metabolism
appears as a peculiar complex of physical processes and socioeconomic
activities marked by waves of growth and decline. Cycles of expansion
and contraction are typical of societal metabolism historical dynamics,
demonstrating their unstable equilibrium. However, these cycles are
not only shaped by the physical conditions of resource appropriation
but also by social and political actors and their often-turbulent relation-
ships to rule that appropriation. The mode in which society organizes
and regulates its own metabolism depends not only on the physical
state of appropriable resources but also on social–property systems,
social conflicts on surplus distribution, long-term demographic and
commercial trends, development of productive forces, and balances of
class forces (Brenner, 1977; Pomeranz, 2000). The political regulation
or ecology of metabolism is deeply affected by theway in which society
is hierarchically stratified. For example, the slave trade fostered by
European countries created a new type of periphery that enabled
Europe to exchange an ever-growing volume of manufactured exports
for an ever-growing volume of land-intensive products (Pomeranz,
2000). The trade of enslaved people molded the European metabolism
and the way in which it was ruled. Thus, I might say that metabolism
is a matter of social and political—not only physical—investigation
aimed at identifying agents of regulation, their reciprocal connections,
and their ability to cope with resources appropriation.
Some of the scholars that we discuss in this paper were persuaded
that the process of adaptation of an organism to its environment pre-
vents society frombecoming an agent of exploitation or conquest. How-
ever, the exchange ofmatter and energy between a social system and its
environment is not only oriented to simple mechanical reproduction of
the system itself, as in the case of individualmetabolisms or ecosystems.
In these cases, modalities of recovery and transformation of elements
for the reproduction of the organism change very slowly over time
and above all, when they reach a balance, it is maintained over time.
The social or socioeconomic metabolism is not instead directed to a
state of equilibrium, but to increasing growth. It is the historical features
of metabolic regulation that, under capitalist conditions, lead towards
constant growth and accumulation
From this perspective, the metabolic relationship between social and
environmental systems acquires the form of appropriation, colonization,
accumulation or domination. However, here I do not give terms such as
appropriation or colonization a neutral—and therefore analytical—
meaning, as is common in the metabolism literature (See Fischer-
Kowalski and Haberl, 1998; Martinez-Alier, 2002). In my view, these
types of social operations are rationally oriented and motivated (Moore,Please cite this article as: Padovan, D., Metabolic exchanges and practices o
sciences, Ecological Informatics (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoinf2000). It is not a secret that the elaborated scientific knowledge and
practice in the capitalist society are oriented towards the control, ma-
nipulation, and domination of the (broadly speaking) “other” (nature)
(Pellizzoni, 2011). Appropriation of nature means that man manipu-
lates it for his own goals, makes it similar to himself, and assimilates
it. The material appropriation of nature happens through labor and
consumption: nature is marked by human form or is integrated by the
human body (BöhmeandGrebe, 1992). Societies organize their resource
throughput purposively, even changing parameters of natural processes
to gain better access to nature's resource supply (Schandl et al., 2002).
The process of appropriation and transformation of nature in
“appropriated nature” implies the following phenomena that should
be the object of reflection by social sciences because they represent
crucial socio-technical-material interfaces between society and nature:
1. The technological multiplication of the society–nature metabolism
that carries over to increasing consumption of natural resources for
the purpose of extracting and consuming other indispensable
resources such as food.
2. The endless growth of the rate of consumption of raw materials and
primary sources of energy, reaching an unthinkable peak of con-
sumption and forcing the issue of resource renewability.
3. The unending increase in the conversion of matter and energy, to the
point of reaching dimensions comparable to geophysical and biolog-
ical global processes (e.g., the consumption of CO2 stored in the
ground and its release into the atmosphere).
4. The development of knowledge about the natural mechanisms of
reproduction that implies a consequent debugging of technological
devices able to regulate, transform, and alter such mechanisms of
ecosystem services reproduction.
Reflecting on the basis of metabolic horizon means that sociology
should be applied to the study of the interaction of man and nature as
“natural processes socially organized.”As seen above, KarlMarx realized
that the process of capitalist production based on socially useful labor is
the main medium of interchange between society and nature. The pro-
cess of appropriating nature suggests the following reflections:
• The process is essentially “material”, nothing idealistic appears in this
situation and the set of social practices is designed tomonitor and reg-
ulate the powers of nature. This process involves the laborer's use of
themechanical, physical, and chemical properties of some substances
to make other substances subservient to his aims.
• The process of appropriation is historically determined, changing
according to the basic degree of societal development, in other
words, on the basis of the progress of work and technical processes,
as noted by sociologists of the time. The metabolic process thus indi-
cates the socio-technical complexity of social systems.
• Finally, the process of capitalist accumulation disturbs themetabolism
between man and earth, which is the return to the land of the nat-
ural resources consumed by various forms of livelihood. “Capitalist
production” collects the population together in great centers and
causes the urban population to achieve an ever-growing preponder-
ance. This has two results. On the one hand, it concentrates on the his-
torical motive power of society; on the other hand, it disturbs the
metabolic interaction between man and the earth, i.e., it prevents
the return to the soil of its constituent elements consumed by man
in the form of food and clothing; thus, it hinders the operation of
the eternal natural condition for the lasting fertility of the soil. There-
fore, it destroys at the same time the physical health of the urban
worker and the intellectual life of the rural worker… Capitalist pro-
duction, therefore, only develops the techniques and the degree of
combination of the social process of production by simultaneously
undermining the original sources of all wealth—the soil and theworker
(Marx, 1976: 637–638).
Marx's position was never adequately investigated in the field of
political economy, but it found an indirect and unreported receptionf regulation: The assemblage of environment and society in early social
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that evolution had transformed man from a “brute creature” in compe-
tition with other animals to a dominator of the planet, able to subdue
the earth for his needs. The birth and development of social systems,
built up by civilized men in the image of their biological individuality,
led to negative consequences both for nature and for society.
Benjamin Kidd stressed that the fight for survival that was the basis
of the evolution of social systems led to the disappearance of entire
civilizations and indigenous peoples, alongwith the irrational appropri-
ation of a large amount of natural resources (Kidd, 1894). According to
Kidd, Anglo-Saxons exterminated the less developed peopleswithwhom
they had entered into competition, not only through bloody wars of
extermination but also by imposing laws thatwere no less deadly. How-
ever, perhaps the main weapon of Western civilization has been its
occupation of native territories to exploit natives' resources. Although
Kidd was not aware of doing so, his work was a moralizing but clear
description of the era of European ecological imperialism later described
in brilliant colors by Alfred Crosby (Crosby, 1986).
Kidd referred to a phenomenon that geographers of the same period
reported: Raubwirtschaft. The Raubwirtschaft, literally “predatory
economy” (Raumolin, 1984), is the negative side of social metabolism.
The term refers to local distortions in the balance of nature caused by
industrial capitalism, but its use in nineteenth-century geography was
essentially moral in nature, lacking a precise theoretical meaning. The
geographer Ernst Friedrich was the first to express this concept, in
which he assumed that a rational exchange of resources and energy be-
tween nature and society must ensure and enhance their durability.
Human evolution in increasingly complex social systems can only in-
crease the pressure on natural resources in a manner that is aggressive
enough to cause serious imbalances. The main thrust of Raubwirtschaft
comes from the social tendency to move, a phenomenon that involves
the irreversible consumption of energy resources. This irrational con-
sumption of resources affects not only mines, forests and agricultural
land, as already noted by others but also human labor, which in turn
may be a victim of Raubwirtschaft. According to sociologists discussed
above, even Friedrich believed that resources exploitation leads to an
increasing environmental awareness and to measures of regulation
and protection of natural resources, but I believe that such optimism
is tinged with hypocrisy and self-indulgence, not unlike optimism
expressed currently.
Several natural and social scientists related Raubwirtschaft to the
degradation of energy or entropy. Bernard Brunhes showed how human
activity causes disorder in living nature and suggested to use the notion
of entropy to indicate not only energy dissipation phenomena in nature
but also processes of social degradation. Sociologists such as Eugène de
Roberty addressed social energy, whereas intellectuals such as Rosa Lux-
emburg used the metabolic metaphor to argue that capitalist develop-
ment is nourished by the destruction of precapitalist economic forms,
inclusive of natural and human resources. More recently, such predatory
activity has been called ecological imperialism (Foster and Clark, 2004).
To maintain their metabolism, societies transform natural systems
so as to maximize their usefulness for social purposes. Natural ecosys-
tems are thus replaced by agro-ecosystems designed to produce as
much usable biomass as possible, or else they are converted into a
space to be built. Animals are domesticated and the genetic codes of
species are altered to improve their resistance to parasites and pesti-
cides or to produce drugs. Next, “material–ecological” flows transform
relationships between city and country and between global metropo-
lises and the periphery. Some countries are robbed of their resources,
transformingwhole ecosystems uponwhich states and nations depend.
Massive movements of population and labor that are interconnected
with the extraction and transfer of resources are generated. Ecological
wastes are dumped in ways that widen the chasm between the center
and the periphery. Overall, a global ‘metabolic rift’ is created that char-
acterizes the relationship between capitalism and the environment
while at the same time limiting capitalist development.Please cite this article as: Padovan, D., Metabolic exchanges and practices o
sciences, Ecological Informatics (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoinfThese interactions between natural and social systems, however,
cannot define metabolic exchanges of matter and energy. These
modes of intervention in natural systems represent a real colonization,
i.e., a set of social activities that deliberately change important parame-
ters of natural systems and actively keep them in conditions different
from those that would have arisen in the absence of such intervention.
Colonization can be seen as a strategy to ensure the future availability of
natural resources, which implies at the same time an extraordinary
increase in cognitive and manual work and the exceptional develop-
ment of an increasingly energy-consuming general intellect. The fate
of humanity is caught in this dilemma: capitalist regulation and the
accumulation of natural resources require an unlimited increase in
consumption.
7. Conclusions
This article attempts to highlight how a metabolic approach to the
relationship between society and nature is useful for sociological
knowledge—it is more fertile than culturalist, symbolic and con-
structionist approaches. Many sociologists and naturologists of the
nineteenth century were more than convinced that there were no
definitive borders between their disciplines and that understanding
society depends on nature and vice versa. There were no good scien-
tific reasons to build such a deep ditch between the two scientific
kingdoms—including the fact that the natural sciences grew faster
than the social ones, even if true to a certain extent. Hermeneutics
was invented precisely to fill the methodological gap between natural
and human sciences to cause the objects of social research to reflexively
talk. Kantianism, historicism and the culturalist idealism of late nine-
teenth century were most likely primarily responsible for this final
separation that endures to this day, although it must be said that both
Weber and Durkheim addressed problems very close to the environ-
ment, such as the agrarian question, social energetics, and the demo-
graphic impact on the physiology of the social organism. However, a
history of this separation must still be thoroughly investigated, and
that effort could bring to the surface some interesting issues related to
the epistemological and ethical–moral aspects of the history of sociolo-
gy, such as the long hegemony of raciological thought.
The fact that consumers are periodically asked about their environ-
mental concerns does not addmuch to what we already know: namely,
without radical policies, actions, and practices, social inertia does not
move from its track, the path dependency established by disguised pol-
icies does not interrupt, shortsighted and unidirectional technologies
are not replaced, and unequal social configurations remain hegemonic.
Ametabolicmodel instead implies a close interdependence between
nature and society, helps to explain the evolution of the social as deeply
dependent on the natural, brings together nature and society on the
horizon of consumption and transformation of matter and energy, and
is able to typify different social forms based on the manner in which
resources are extracted, processed, consumed and ejected. Metabolism,
being the basic mechanism of all organic existence, also constitutes the
first form of freedom (Jonas, 1966).
Further advancements in metabolic vision tell us that the process of
exchange between society and nature has turned towards a variable
process of interpenetration and intermingling between society and
nature to build up new social hybrids or assemblages. The type of
society/nature complex delineated by early sociologists could be seen
as very close to the assemblage concept (DeLanda, 2006). DeLanda stat-
ed that what Gilles Deleuze calls “assemblages” is the main theoretical
alternative to organic totalities, wholes characterized by relations of
exteriority among the component parts of wholes such as social systems
and ecosystems. These relations imply that a component part of an
assemblagemay be detached from it and plugged into a different assem-
blage, resulting in different interactions. In addition, Deleuze considers
the heterogeneity of components to be an important characteristic of
assemblages. Thus, the society/nature complex might be considered af regulation: The assemblage of environment and society in early social
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over history in the relationship between sociotechnical and organiza-
tional conditions of social labor and practices delivered by it.When soci-
ology became more rationalist and individualist, it lost this perspective,
which linked society and nature while wishing to build a homogenous
totality called society.
The metabolic approaches discussed here open interesting opportu-
nities, both scientific and practical. A sociology of metabolic processes
has the advantage of addressing the following aspects:
• Accounting natural resources, biodiversity and biocapacity that are
actually consumed by the socioeconomic metabolism, providing some
tools to evaluate the effectiveness of environmental policies.
• Reassembling a theoretical gap between production and consumption
that has plagued the social sciences for decades, recognizing that from
the environmental point of view, almost every practice, activity,
or action involves the consumption of nature. Biotic consumption is
intrinsic—almost like a metaphysical substance, although it is not—
to both productive and social consumption.
• Identifying the complex interfaces between society and nature that
sociologymust investigate. This obviously means to identify the com-
plex space full of practices, knowledge, discourses, techniques, tech-
nologies, and organizations that enable society and its subsystems to
reproduce by appropriating natural resources. This space of “contact”
between the social and natural systems is the system of social appro-
priation of nature as it has evolved throughout history and today
pushes the apical points of colonization and appropriation, putting
to work all human resources that are available in the social system.
• Avoiding importing biological models to explain social phenomena.
The metabolic approach addresses exchanges between nature and
society, but eludes the social biologicization that often surreptitiously
creeps into attempts to combine the two worlds, as in the case of
sociobiology. The study of the metabolic cycle is not intended to
bend the functioning of the social to the necessity of natural laws,
but rather to identify the simultaneous effects generated by the met-
abolic fracture or rift on natural and socioeconomic systems.
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